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Inference to the Best Prediction
A Reply to Wanja Wiese
Anil K. Seth
Responding to Wanja Wiese’s incisive commentary, I  first develop the analogy
between predictive  processing  and scientific  discovery.  Active  inference in  the
Bayesian brain turns out to be well characterized by abduction (inference to the
best explanation), rather than by deduction or induction. Furthermore, the em-
phasis on control highlighted by cybernetics suggests that active inference can be
a process of “inference to the best prediction”, leading to a distinction between
“epistemic”  and  “instrumental”  active  inference.  Secondly,  on  the  relationship
between perceptual presence and objecthood, I recognize a distinction between
the “world revealing” presence of phenomenological objecthood, and the experi-
ence of “absence of presence” or “phenomenal unreality”. Here I propose that
world-revealing presence (objecthood) depends on counterfactually rich predictive
models that are necessarily hierarchically deep, whereas phenomenal unreality
arises when active inference fails to unmix causes “in the world” from those that
depend on the perceiver. Finally, I return to control-oriented active inference in
the setting of interoception, where cybernetics and predictive processing are most
closely connected.
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1 Introduction
It  is  a pleasure to respond to  Wanja Wiese’s
stimulating commentary (this collection), from
which I learned a great deal. Much of what he
says stands easily by itself, so here I select just
a few key points which warrant further develop-
ment in light of his analysis.
2 Active inference and hypothesis testing
A central claim in my target paper is that act-
ive inference, typically considered as the resol-
ution of sensory prediction errors through ac-
tion, should also (perhaps primarily) be con-
sidered as furnishing disruptive and/or disam-
biguatory evidence for perceptual hypotheses.
This  claim  transparently  calls  on  analogies
with hypothesis testing in science (as well as
on counterfactually-equipped generative mod-
els), and so invites comparisons with theoret-
ical  frameworks  for  scientific  discovery,  as
Wiese  nicely  develops.  In  particular,  Wiese
notes that I do not “say much about what it
takes  to  disconfirm  or  falsify  a  given  hypo-
thesis or model”, inviting me to “provide a re-
fined treatment of the relation between falsi-
fication and active inference” (this collection,
p. 2). This is what I shall attempt in this first
section.
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2.1 The abductive brain
Wiese rightly says that a strict Popperian ana-
logy for active inference is inappropriate since
Popperian falsification relies on hypotheses that
are  derived  deductively.  Deductive  inferences
are  necessary  inferences,  meaning  that  their
falsification in turn falsifies the premises (theor-
ies) from which they derive. Active inference in
the Bayesian brain is not deductive for two im-
portant reasons. First, as Wiese notes, Bayesian
inference is inherently probabilistic so that com-
peting hypotheses  become more or  less  likely,
rather than corroborated or falsified. Probabil-
istic weighting of hypotheses suggests a process
of  induction rather  than  deduction.  Inductive
inferences are  non-necessary  (i.e., they are not
inevitable consequences of  their  premises) and
are assessed by observation of outcome statist-
ics,  by analogy with  classical  statistical  infer-
ence. Second, Bayesian reasoning pays attention
not just to outcome frequencies but to proper-
ties  of  the  explanation  (hypothesis)  itself,  as
captured by the slogan that (Bayesian) percep-
tion is the brain’s “best guess” of the causes of
its  sensory  inputs.  This  indicates  that  the
Bayesian brain is neither deductive nor induct-
ive but  abductive (Hohwy 2014), where abduc-
tion is typically understood as “inference to the
best explanation”. In Bayesian inference, what
makes a “best” explanation rests not only on
outcome frequencies, but also on quantification
of model complexity (models with fewer para-
meters are preferred), and by priors, likelihoods,
as well as hyper-priors which may make some
prior-likelihood  combinations  more  preferable
than  others.  Importantly,  abductive  (and  in-
ductive) processes are ampliative, meaning that
they are capable of going beyond that which is
logically entailed by their premises. This is im-
portant  for  the  Bayesian  brain,  because  the
fecundity  and  complexity  of  the  world  (and
body) requires a flexible and open-ended means
of adaptive response.
So,  the  Bayesian  brain  is  an  abductive
brain. But I would like to go further, recalling
that active inference enables predictive  control
in addition to perception. This emphasis is par-
ticularly clear in the parallels with cybernetics
and applications to interoception developed in
the  target  article,  where  allostasic1 control  of
‘essential  variables’  is  paramount,  and  where
predictive  models  are  recruited  towards  this
goal Conant & Ashby 1970; Seth 2013). In this
light, active inference in the cybernetic Bayesian
brain  becomes  a  process  of  “inference  to  the
best  prediction”,  where  the  “best”  predictions
are those which enable control and homeostasis
under a broad repertoire  of  perturbations.2 It
will be interesting to fully develop criteria for
“best-making” in this  control-oriented form of
abductive inference.
2.2 Sophisticated falsificationism, active 
inference, and model disambiguation
Where does this leave us with respect to theor-
ies of scientific discovery? Strict Popperian falsi-
fication was already discounted as an analogy
for active inference. At the other extreme, par-
allels with Kuhnian paradigm shifts also seem
inappropriate since these are not based on infer-
ence whether deductive, inductive, or abductive.
Also,  such  shifts  are  typically  unidirectional:
having  dispensed  with  the  Copernican  world-
view once, we are unlikely to return to it in the
future. These two points challenge Wiese’s ana-
logy  between  paradigm  shifts  and  perceptual
transitions  in  bistable  perception  (see  Wiese’s
footnote  12,  this collection,  p.  9).  What  best
survives in  this  analogy is  an appeal  to hier-
archical inference, where changes in “paradigm”
correspond to  alternations  between hierarchic-
ally  deep  predictions,  each  of  which  recruit
more fine-grained predictions which themselves
each explain only part  of  the ongoing sensor-
imotor flux, under the hyper-prior that percep-
tual  scenes must be self-consistent (Hohwy et
al. 2008).
Wiese himself seems to favour Lakatos’ in-
terpretation of Popper, a “sophisticated falsific-
ationism”  where  theories  (perceptual  hypo-
theses)  can  be  modified  rather  than  rejected
outright,  when  predictions  are  not  confirmed,
1 Allostasis: the process of achieving homeostasis.
2 There is an interesting analogy here to the overlooked “perceptual
control theory” of William T. Powers, which says that living things
control their perceived environment by means of their behavior, so
that perceptual variables are the targets of control (1973).
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and where hypotheses are not tested in isolation
(more on this later). As Wiese shows, sophistic-
ated falsification fits well with some aspects of
Bayesian  inference,  like  model  updating.  Ac-
cording  to  Lakatos,  core  theoretical  commit-
ments can be protected from immediate falsific-
ation  by  introducing  “auxiliary  hypotheses”
which account for otherwise incompatible data
(1970). The key criterion - in the philosophy of
science sense - is that these auxiliary hypotheses
are  progressive in  virtue of  making additional
testable predictions, as opposed to  degenerate,
which  is  when the  core  commitments  become
less testable.3 This maps neatly to counterfactu-
ally-equipped active inference, where hierarchic-
ally  deep  predictive  models  spawn  testable
counterfactual  sensorimotor  predictions  which
are selected on the basis of precision expecta-
tions,  and  which  lead  to  effective  updating
(rather than “falsification”) of perceptual hypo-
theses. As Wiese notes, a good example of this
is given by Friston and colleagues’ model of sac-
cadic  eye  movements  (Friston et  al. 2012).
When it comes to model comparison, sophistic-
ated  falsification  may even approximate  some
aspects  of  abductive  inference:  “Explaining
away is another example of sophisticated falsi-
fication.  Even  when  two  or  more  models  are
compatible  with  the evidence  … there  can  be
reason  to  prefer  one  of  them  and  reject  the
other”  (Wiese this collection,  p.  7).  This
strongly recalls Bayesian model comparison and
“inference to the best  explanation”,  if  not its
control-oriented  “inference  to  the  best  predic-
tion” form. 
One  important  clarification  is  needed
about Wiese’s interpretation of model compar-
ison, highlighting the critical roles of action and
counterfactual  processing.  Wiese  rightly  em-
phasizes  the important  insight  of  Popper and
Lakatos  that  hypotheses  are  never  tested  in
3 An important application of this idea is to the Bayesian brain itself
as a scientific hypothesis. A concern about the Bayesian brain hypo-
thesis is  that it can be insulated from falsification by postulating
convenient (typically unobservable) priors, much like adaptationist
explanations in evolutionary biology can be critiqued as “just so”
stories.  The  key  question,  not  answered  here,  is  whether  neural
mechanisms implement (approximations  to) Bayesian inference,  or
whether  Bayesian  concepts  merely  provide  a  useful  interpretative
framework. In the former case one would require the Bayesian brain
hypothesis to be progressive not degenerate.
isolation,  mandating  a  process  of  comparison
among competing models or hypotheses. How-
ever, he implies a sequential testing of each hy-
pothesis:  “balloons  being  launched  and  then
shot done, one by one” (see  Wiese this collec-
tion, p. 6). This is quite different from the inter-
pretation of model comparison pursued in my
target article,  where multiple  models are con-
sidered  in  parallel,  and  where  counterfactual
predictions are leveraged to select the action (or
experiment)  most  likely  to  disambiguate com-
peting models. In Bayesian terms this is reflec-
ted in a shift towards model comparison and av-
eraging  (FitzGerald et  al. 2014;  Rosa et  al.
2012), as compared to inference and learning on
a single model. Bongard and colleagues’ evolu-
tionary robotics example was selected precisely
because it illustrates this point so well (Bongard
et al. 2006). Here, repeated cycles of model se-
lection and refinement lead to the prescription
of novel actions that best disambiguate the cur-
rent best models (note the plural). Indeed, it is
the repeated refinement of disambiguatory ac-
tions  that  gives  Bongard’s  starfish  robot  its
compelling “motor babbling” appearance. To re-
iterate: different actions may be specified when
the objective is to disambiguate multiple models
in parallel, as compared to testing models one-
at-a-time.  In  the  setting  of  the  cybernetic
Bayesian  brain  this  example  is  important  for
two  reasons:  it  underlines  the  importance  of
counterfactual processing (to drive the selection
of  disambiguatory  actions)  and  it  emphasizes
that  predictive  modelling  can  be  seen  as  a
means of  control in  addition to discovery,  ex-
planation,  or  representation.  In  this  sense  it
doesn’t  matter  how  accurate  the  starfish  self
model is – what matters is whether it works. 
2.3 Science as control or science as 
discovery?
The distinction between explanation and control
returns  us  to  the  philosophy  of  science.  Put
simply, the views of Popper, Lakatos, and (less
so) Kuhn, are concerned with how science re-
veals truths about the world, and how falsifica-
tion of testable predictions participates in this
process.  Picking  up the threads of  abduction,
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control-oriented active inference, and “inference
to the best prediction”, we encounter the pos-
sibility  that  theories  of  scientific  discovery
might themselves appear differently when con-
sidered from the perspective of control. Historic-
ally, it is easy to see the narrative of science as
a struggle to gain increasing control over the en-
vironment (and over people), rather than a pro-
cess  guided  by the  lights  of  increasing  know-
ledge and understanding.4 A proper exploration
of this territory moves well beyond the present
scope (see e.g.,  Glazebrook 2013). In any case,
whether or not this perspective helps elucidate
scientific practice, it certainly suggests import-
ant  limits  in  how far  analogies  can  be  taken
between philosophies of scientific discovery and
the cybernetic Bayesian brain.
3 Perceptual presence and counterfactual
richness 
The second part of Wiese’s commentary picks
up on the issue of  perceptual presence, which
in my target article  was associated with the
“richness” of counterfactual sensorimotor pre-
dictions  (see  also  Seth 2014,  2015b).  Wiese
makes a number of connected points. First, he
rightly  notes  an  ambiguity  between  object-
hood and presence in perceptual phenomeno-
logy, as presented in my target article  (Seth
this collection) and in Seth (2014). Second, he
introduces the notion of  causal encapsulation
as a third phenomenological dimension, com-
plementing  counterfactual  richness  and  per-
spective dependence. He spends some time de-
veloping  examples  based  on  cognitive  phe-
nomenology  and  mental  action  to  illustrate
how  these  dimensions  might  relate.  Here,  I
will  focus  on  the  relationship  between  pres-
ence and objecthood from the perspective of
counterfactual predictive processing – or more
specifically  the  theory  of  “  Predictive  Pro-
cessing  of  SensoriMotor  Contingencies”
(PPSMC; Seth 2014, 2015b).5
4 The continually increasing pressure to justify research in terms of
“impact” – especially when seeking funding – highlights one way in
which an emphasis on control (rather than discovery) is realized in
scientific practice.
5 See also my response (Seth 2015b) to commentaries on (Seth 2014),
which focuses on this issue.
3.1 Presence and objecthood together
As Wiese notes, when visually perceiving a real
tomato  (figure  1A)  there  is  both  a  sense  of
presence (the subjective sense of reality of the
tomato) and of  objecthood (the perception that
a (real) object is the cause of sensations). Im-
portantly,  while  distinct,  these  properties  are
not  independent.  There  is  a  “world-revealing”
dimension  to  perceptual  presence  which  is
closely aligned with the experience of an extern-
ally-existing object: “How can it be true … that
we are perceptually aware, when we look at a
tomato,  of  the  parts  of  the  tomato  which,
strictly  speaking,  we do  not  perceive.  This  is
the puzzle of perceptual presence” (Noë 2006, p.
414).
Figure 1: A. An image of a tomato.  B. An image of a
clear blue sky.
How does this object-related world-reveal-
ing  presence  come  about?  In  predictive  pro-
cessing (and by extension PPSMC), objecthood
depends  on  predictive  models  encoding  hier-
archically  deep  invariances  that  accommodate
complex  nonlinear  mappings  from  (object-re-
lated, world-revealing) hidden causes to sensory
signals (Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013). There is a re-
ciprocal  dependency here  between hierarchical
depth and counterfactual  richness,  because (i)
hierarchically  deep  invariances  in  generative
models  enable  precise  predictions  about  rich
repertoires of counterfactual sensorimotor map-
pings, and (ii) counterfactual richness can scaf-
fold the acquisition of hierarchically deep invari-
ant predictions. One might even say that hier-
archically  deep  invariances  are  partly  consti-
tuted by (possibly latent) predictions of counter-
factually  rich  sensorimotor  mappings  (Seth
2015b).  These  dependencies  indicate  that  ob-
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jecthood  and  world-revealing  presence  depend
on  expectations about counterfactual  richness,
rather than counterfactual richness per se. Alto-
gether,  counterfactually-informed  active  infer-
ence  enables  the  extraction  and  encoding  of
hierarchically deep hidden causes of sensory sig-
nals.  In virtue of hierarchical depth, these in-
ferred causes will also be  perspective invariant,
in the sense that they will have been separated
from those causes that depend on on actions (or
other  properties)  of  the  perceiver  (see  Wiese
this collection, p. 11).  In short,  to the extent
that objecthood and perceptual presence go to-
gether,  so  do  hierarchical  depth  (encoding
world-revealing  invariances)  and  (expected)
counterfactual richness.
3.2 Presence and objecthood apart
So far so good, but it is evident that presence
and objecthood do not  always go together (Di
Paolo 2014; Froese 2014; Madary 2014), a phe-
nomenological fact which requires further ana-
lysis (Seth 2015b). Presence without objecthood
is exemplified in vision by the experience of a
uniform deep blue sky (Figure 1B), and is also
characteristic of non-visual modalities like olfac-
tion (Madary 2014). The visual impression of a
blue sky, or the tang of briny sea air, both seem
perceptually present  but  without eliciting any
specific  phenomenology  of  objecthood.  At  the
same time, the corresponding predictive models
are likely to be hierarchically shallow and coun-
terfactually poor:  there is  not much I can do
(besides closing my eyes or looking away) to al-
ter the sensory input evoking a blue-sky experi-
ence,  and  the  inferred  hidden  causes  are  un-
likely to lie  behind multiple  inferential  layers.
Hierarchical shallowness may explain the lack of
phenomenal  objecthood,  but  why  isn’t  there
also a lack of perceptual presence? 
Blue-sky-experiences  (and  olfactory
scenes)  actually  do lack  the  world-revealing
presence associated with objecthood. But they
do not appear phenomenally unreal in the sense
that  perceptual  afterimages  and  synaesthetic
concurrents  are  experienced  as  unreal.  In
PPSMC, phenomenal unreality can arise from
an inferential failure to separate hidden causes
in the world, from those that depend on actions
(or  other  properties)  of  the  perceiver  (Seth
2015b). This in turn emerges from violations of
counterfactual  predictions.  For  example,  con-
sider how saccadic eye movements engage coun-
terfactual  predictions.  Perceptual  afterimages
track  eye  movements,  violating  counterfactual
predictions associated with world-revealing hid-
den causes that rest on active inference. In con-
trast, counterfactual predictions associated with
blue skies are less amenable to disconfirmation
by eye movements, so (non-object-related) per-
ceptual presence remains.6 
Summarizing,  perceptual  presence,  as  an
explanatory  target,  can  be  refined  into  (i)  a
world-revealing presence associated with object-
hood and hierarchical depth, and (ii) a phenom-
enal unreality arising from a failure to inferen-
tially separate hidden causes in the world from
those associated with the perceiver.  Both rely
on counterfactual processing, and so both call
on  active  inference.  Perspective  invariance  is
also  implicated  in  objecthood  (through  hier-
archical  depth)  and  phenomenal  unreality
(through  isolating  worldy  causes),  suggesting
that  this  dimension  may not  be  as  separable
from  counterfactual  richness  as  proposed  by
Wiese (this collection,  p.  13).  But is  that  all
there is to presence?
3.3 Causal encapsulation and 
embodiment
Wiese distinguishes three dimensions to percep-
tual  presence:  counterfactual  richness  (vs.
poverty),  perspective  invariance  (vs.  depend-
ence),  and  causal  encapsulation  (vs.  integra-
tion). The third of these, causal encapsulation,
is perhaps the hardest to pin down. The idea as
I understand it, is  that a representation (pre-
dictive model) is causally encapsulated if it is
inferentially isolated from other hidden causes;
by contrast it is causally open or integrated if it
expresses a rich set of relations to other inferred
6 Phenomenal unreality on this story corresponds to a loss of “transpar-
ency” as described by (Metzinger 2003). For Metzinger, transparency is
lost – and phenomenal unrealness results – when the “construction pro-
cess” underlying perception becomes available for attentional processing.
This maps neatly on a failure to inferentially unmix world-related from
perceiver-related hidden causes – see Seth (2015b) for more on this.
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causes.  So,  a  predictive  model  underlying the
experience of a tomato may be causally integ-
rated with that underlying the experience of the
table on which it lies, and the hand (maybe my
hand), which is poised to reach out and pick it
up.  Here,  there  may  be  a  relation  between
causal encapsulation/integration and the infer-
ential unmixing of perceiver-related and world-
related  hidden  causes:  a  failure  to  separate
these  causes  would  presumably  prevent  rich
causal integration with other hidden causes in
the world. 
The concept of causal encapsulation high-
lights another interesting aspect of Wiese’s com-
mentary:  the  idea  that  counterfactual  predic-
tions may not always encode sensorimotor con-
tingencies: “it might be equally relevant to en-
code how sensory signals pertaining to the to-
mato would change if the wind were to blow …
or if the tomato were to fall down” (Wiese this
collection,  p.  11).  While  such  extra-personal
causal  contingencies  may  be  salient  in  many
cases, I see them as secondary to sensorimotor
body-related  counterfactual  predictions.  By
definition they do not involve active inference: I
have to wait for the wind to change direction
(though perhaps I might move to get a better
view). This means that many central features of
active inference discussed here – its relation to
predictive control, homeostasis, and counterfac-
tually-informed model disambiguation – do not
apply.
The body re-emerges here as central, this
time as a ground for the generation of coun-
terfactual predictions. Specifically, bodily con-
straints shape counterfactual predictions since
they place limits  on how actions can be de-
ployed  in  intervening  upon  the  (inferred)
causes  of  sensory  input.  This  suggests  that
changing action repertoires would alter experi-
ences of presence. Wiese raises out-of-body-ex-
periences and dream experiences as a relevant
context (this collection, p. 15), where subjects
sometimes identify their first-person-perspect-
ive, not with a body, but with an unextended
point in space. I agree with him that examin-
ing  world-revealing  presence  in  these  situ-
ations would be fascinating, if extremely diffi-
cult in practice. 
The body is of course not only a source of
counterfactual predictions,  but also  the target
of  counterfactually-informed  active  inference,
both for representation (exemplified by the rub-
ber-hand-illusion, as mentioned by Wiese) and
for control.7 As emphasized in the target article,
control-oriented active inference is  particularly
significant  for  interoception,  where  predictive
modelling  is  geared  towards  allostasis  and
homeostasis rather than accurate representation
(see also Seth 2013). Returning the focus to in-
teroceptive inference raises a host of intriguing
questions, which can only gestured at here. One
may  straightaway  wonder  how  counterfactual
aspects  of  interoceptive  inference  shape  the
“presence” of emotional and body-related exper-
iences. Is it possible to have an emotional ex-
perience  lacking  in  “affective  presence”  –  and
what is the phenomenological correlate of “ob-
jecthood”  for  interoceptive  experience?  Other
interesting questions are how precision weight-
ing  sets  the  balance  between  representation
versus control in active interoceptive inference,
and what it  means to isolate “wordly” causes
when both the means and the targets of active
inference are realized in the body. These are not
just  theoretical  questions:  advances  in  virtual
reality (Suzuki et al. 2013) and in methods for
measuring  interoceptive  signals  (Hallin &  Wu
1998) promise real empirical progress on these
issues.
4 Conclusions
This response has been shaped by Wiese’s per-
spicuous focus on the philosophy of science and
on the phenomenology of  perceptual presence.
My response to the first topic was to frame the
Bayesian brain in terms of  control-oriented ab-
7 Wiese, when discussing König’s FeelSpace project (Kaspar 2014), in-
terprets PPSMC as saying that increased practice with the FeelSpace
compass belt – and hence increased counterfactual richness– would
lead to “increased perceptual presence (for the belt, or the vibra-
tions, or the hip/waist, etc.)” (Wiese this collection, p. 17). I see
things differently. The counterfactual predictions, while mediated by
the belt, relate to hidden causes in the world (e.g., magnetic north).
In fact, PPSMC says that FeelSpace practice would lead to hierarch-
ically deep and counterfactually rich models of how “magnetic north”
impacts on belt vibrations and the like, leading to increased world-
revealing presence for these worldly causes but diminished perceptual
presence of the tactile stimulation itself. Still, the FeelSpace project
certainly provides a fertile empirical testbed for the ideas raised here.
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duction, where falsification is replaced by “infer-
ence to the best prediction” as a criterion for
progress.  I  also  reinforced  the  dependency
between active inference and counterfactual pro-
cessing, which underpins the important case of
disambiguatory  active  inference  in  Bayesian
model comparison. With respect to perceptual
presence  I  proposed  a  distinction  between
world-revealing  presence  and  phenomenal  un-
reality  (Seth 2015b).  World-revealing  presence
corresponds  to  objecthood  and  is  associated
with hierarchical depth, expected counterfactual
richness, and perspective invariance of percep-
tual  hypotheses.  Phenomenal  unreality  tran-
spires when perceptual inference fails to unmix
world-related from perceiver-related causes; this
corresponds to a loss of “phenomenal transpar-
ency” (Metzinger 2003) and depends on viola-
tion of counterfactual sensorimotor predictions.
Space  constraints  prevented  me  considering
Wiese’s discussion of the “presence” of cognitive
phenomenology, like abstract mathematical and
philosophical thinking, in these terms. There is
of course a rich literature in linking such phe-
nomena to  the  body (Lakoff &  Nunez 2001),
and hence perhaps to active inference where the
concept  of  a  “mental  action” becomes critical
(O’Brien &  Soteriou 2009).  Space  constraints
also  prevented  Wiese  from elaborating  on  in-
teroception, which I consider the most interest-
ing setting for control-oriented active inference,
in  virtue  of  the  cybernetics-inspired  emphasis
on homeostasis and allostasis. Interesting ques-
tions  emerge  here  about  how  counterfactual
processing plays into the phenomenology of in-
teroceptive experience.
Cognitive scientists have long argued for a
continuity  between  perception  and  action
(Dewey 1896). To close, I suggest thinking in-
stead of a continuum between epistemic and in-
strumental active inference. This is simply the
idea that active inference – a continuous process
involving both perception and action – can be
deployed with an emphasis on predictive control
(instrumental),  or  on  revealing  the  causes  of
sensory signals (epistemic). This process inter-
twines  interoception,  proprioception,  and  ex-
teroception, and autonomic and motoric action,
with the balance always delicately orchestrated
by  precision  optimisation  and  counterfactual
processing. Putting things this way provides a
new way to  link “life”  and “mind” (Godfrey-
Smith 1996) and may help reveal the biological
imperatives  underlying  perception,  emotion,
and selfhood.
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